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13OLSTEREI) by higher short-term market in-
terest rates and a lower rate of inflation than those
abroad, theU.S. do]larhas been quite strong in foreign
exchange markets since the middle of 1980. Its trade—
weighted value has risen 35 percent from Jnly 1980 to
April 1982. 1 ‘rue general strength of the dollar has
elicited sharp criticism from foreign monetary author-
ities who argue that a stronger dollar fbrces them to
choose between two unpleasant alternatives: fbllow
domestic policies that result in historically high in-
terest rates or accept depreciation oftheir currencies.
Within the standard conceptual framework of ex-
change rate determination, movements of exchange
rates, in the shortrun, are caused primarily In’changes
in interest—rate differentials. 2 Specifically, an increase
in U.S. interest rates relative to those abroad should
result in an incrcase in the foreign currency value of
the dollar, other things equal. As the above criticisms
demonstrate, however, exchange rate movements also
may play an important role in influencing monetary
t
The trade—weighted exchange ratc is an average ofthe value ofthe
dollar against 10 other currenciesweighted by cach country’s trade
share, The countries included areBelgium. Canada. France. Cer—
many, Italy, Japan, theNetherlands. Sweden, Switzerland anti the
United Kingdom - For a more detailed explanation. sec “Index of
the Weighted—Average Exchange Value ofthe U - S. Dollar: Revi—
sion,” Federal Reserve J3nIleOn (August 1978), p. 700. The trade-
weighted foreign interest rate presented below is a weighted
average ofshort—term market interest ratesbr the same countries
nsing the same weights.
2
To he technically correct, short—run exchange rate movements are
motivated by differences inreal interest rates, i.e., market interest
rates adjusted for expected inflation. F’or a mole thorough discus-
sion, see Dallas S. Batten, ‘Foreign Exchange Markets-. The Dol-
lar in 1980.” this Review (April 1981), PP 22-30. Consequently,
changes in market interest—rate difierentials aisd movements of
exchange rates should he positively related only if’the changes in
tssarket interest—rate differentials reflect changes in rent interest—
rate differentials -
policy actions in some countries, which will he
reflected in turn by changes in their short—term domes-
tic interest rates. That is, a foreign monetary author-
ity’s response to changes in the exchange value of its
currency may he to pursue a policy that affects the
levels of its domestic interest rates. Consequently,
when observing movements ofboth the exchange rate
and the interest—rate cliflercntial, it is not immediately
clear whether a change in the differential causes the
exchange rate to change or whether the interest rate
change is a monetary policy response to the exchange
rate movement.
This element of uncertainty has been especially
prevalent fbr the first three quarters of 1981. Chart 1
presents the trade—weighted fbreign currency value of
the dollar and the difference between the U.S. three—
month CD rate and the trade—weighted fbreign in-
terest rate. \-Vhilethese two seriesexhibit the expected
positive relationship before the first quarter of 1981
and after the third quarter of 1981, they display no
statistically significant relationship during the first
three quarters of i981.~
On the other hand, chart 2 contains the trade-
weighted foreign currency value ofthe dollar and the
trade—weighted foreign interest rate. The relationship
between these two series shows a much different pat-
tern than that between the dollar andthe interest—rate
differential. While demonstrating only a weakpositive
relationship before 1981, the trade-xveighted value of
the dollar and the trade-weighted foreign interest rate
5
The calculated correlationcoefficients between thetrade—weighted
dollar exchange rate and the interest—rate differential reported
weekly ~br the approximate periods, 1/1980-lV/1980. 1/1981-111/
1981 and IV/1981-II/1982, are .7i~5,. 158 and .828, respectively.
The corresponding critical values at the 5 pere’m~tlevel are - 266,
.320 and .339, respectively.
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Chari I
Foreign Exchange Value of the Dollar and U3..-Foreign
Interest Rate Differential
March 1973r100
fbllow extremely similar paths during the first three
quarters of1981. Beginning in the lastquarter of1981,
however, their paths diverge radically, with the trade—
weighted fbreign interestrate in April 1982 hilling to its
july 1980 level, while the dollar continues to rise in
general. ~ Foreign monetary authorities-apparently’
have been relatively more responsive to exchange rate
movements (especially of the dollar) dttring most of
1981 than previously. Moreover, it also appears that
fbreign monetary authorities recently have changed
their response to an increasingly strong dollar.
The ptirpose of this article is to examine this recent
experience using an anal tical framework that de-
scribes and evaluates the policy alternatis’es available
to aIbreign monetary- authority- whose currency is de-
preciating. Of particular importance are the rela-
tionship between external and internal policy objcc—
‘Thecalculatedcorrelationcoelliclen ts betweenthetrade—weighted
dollar exchange mate anrl tlse trade—weightedforeign interest rate
for the periods listed in Ibotnote 3 are .379, .899 and —-
respectively. The critical valuesare the same its thosein footnote 3.
tives, the role played 1w exchange rate movements in
the formation of domestic monetal-v policy and the
consequences of the policy choice.
u~r~tsat-~i.. 4•’i’~5•’ t~•~•)~t~ - ~ ii itt t)ttt
Since the difference between U.S. and foreign
short—tenj, interest rates is a primary determinant of
short—run exchange rate movements, a monetary au-
thority has essentially three policy choices when
domestic interest rates (adjusted fbr relative inflation
rates) are below those of another country. First, it can
do nothing and allow its exchange rate to depreciate
sufficiently to compensate fUr the interest differential.
In this case the economy will incur increased do-
mestic unemployment in the short run as domestic
resources are reallocated from the production of non—
tradable gocds to the production of tradable goods in
response to changing relative prices. If the exchange
rate movement is expected to he only temnporarv,
however, this reallocation mna~-be undesirable since
relative prices are expected to return to previous
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chart 2
Foreign Exchange Value of the Dollar and the Foreign Interest Rate
Source, Board at Govereors øt the Federal Reserve System
may risewiththe pricesofimportsas domestic demand
shifts to import—competing products.”
Second, it can adopt a tighter monetary’ policy to
raise short-term domestic interest rates, thereby re-
ducing the interest-rate differential and mitigating the
downward pressure on its exchange rate.1’Ifthis tight-
er stance conflicts with the country’s domestic objec-
tives, the short—run costs of this choice are increased
domestic unemployment and lower real output
growth.
Third, a monetary authority- can inters”ene in Ibreign
currency markets by purchasing its owncurrency with
its reserves of fbreign currency-. This would increase
the demand for domestic currency relative to fbreign
currency and produce, at least temporarily, a recluc-
‘See H. I. McKinnon. “Optimum Currency Areas.’ Ali,dO’icdn Eco-
tionnic Revien.’ (Septc-mher 1963), pp. 717—2-4.
‘
t
Tl,e mc) sIc’tan’ thu t hot-i tic’s ob’mostoi the im a
1
mss trial cowstnc-s ot hem’
than the United States emrspiov interest ratetargeting as a means of
(:01stroll inlg their asomsev 5npplies. Consequent1y - adcsire to lowc
therate ofis mssm scvgrowth will lead to ass inc’rc’ase itssnarkc’t interest
ran-s (at lc’ast in the sls urt ru Is), Casual ohsenation of tIn’ relts—
tiunship I a-twees s short—tc-nii mssarkc’t issterest rates and th c’ sate ol
11501sev growth in thc’se countries ssmppurts this em ,c:ls,siu
tion in the downward pressure on its exchange rate. It
is not immediately clear whether the interyention will
affect the exchange rate permanently. Consequently,
an investigation of the conditions under which in—
ters’ention will permanently affect the long-runpath of
exchange rate moyements is crucial in determining
whether intervention canhe effective in counteracting
the impact ofunfavorable interest-rate difkrentials on
the exchange rate.
In analyzing the permanent nature of the impact of
central bank interyention on the exchange rate, one
must distinguish sales or purchases of foreign curren-
cies that affect the size of the domestic money supply
Intervention policy may not be necessarily aimed at persnanently
affecting tlse exchange i-ate, Instead, its ft,cus may be siniply to
smooth short—run exchange rate fluctuations without having ally
inspact on the long—run patis ofexd-}sange rate us nvesis cuts, In this
latter case, intervention that only tesmsporarilv ail’eets c’xehamsge
rates is sufficient to aecumplish tIns objective. See, for c-xasssple.
\I ichael NIussa. ‘‘The Role of d )fficial Intenention, ‘‘ Occasional
Paper No, 6 (Group ufTlsirty. I 98t). The purpose csf this’’artiele
however, is to analyze pube~altet’natives dessgnecl to c’oalstertsc’t
tlse inspact oi’tinEmvoralsIc intend’st rate difieresstials. Con sequelst—
lv- the pres tinsed gcsal of smoothing slsort—run cxciiange ratc’
fluctuations is igssorecl here.
A 5 0 N 0 1F MA M1 J AS 0 N D I F M A N
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from those that do not. ‘~Specifically, inters-ention is
said to he “sterilized’’ if its impact on the domestic’
money- supply is othet by the sale or purchase of
domestic assets by the central hank. Intervention is
said to he unsterilized if its dUct on the level of
commercial hank reserves and, consequently, the
domestic money supply is not offset (see box).
h[./.is.ti:~./-.ili1.ca1lnterr-enfi.csis c/nt!
Exchange Pcai:e Micrem.ents-
Suppose, forexample, that the Fed attempts topre-
ventthe dollarfrom depreciating bypurchasing dlollars
with Deutsche marks (DM). If this interyention is
unsterilized, it can affect the exchange rate in at least
three ways. First, because the Fed’s pttrchase of dol-
lars temporarilyincreases theflow demand for dollars
relative to the supply of dollars, the immediate effect
should he an appreciation ofthe dollar (or a deprecia-
tion ofthe Deutsche mark).°This result, however, will
be only transitory unless the Fed continues to pur-
chase dollars day after day, thereby maintaining the
higher flow demand for dollars.~o
Second, since this transaction is unsterilized, it
causes the U.S. money supply to fall and the German
money supply to rise. ~All other things edlual, there xyill
be an excess deniand for U.S. money in the United
States and an excess supply ofGerman money in West
Germany — a stock disequilibrium that can he rec-
tified only if aggregate spending hills in the United
States and rises in Germany. This decline in U.S.
spending and rise in German spending will cause the
general price level in the U.S. to fall and that in Ger-
For colsvenienee, itis assumed that all interventic,n operations ale
perfi,rlsied by the c:m’nt,-ai bank. See A. 13. Balbach. ‘The Mechan-
ics ofInteryemstion in Exchange Ma,’kets.” thsis Reciecc’ (F’ebs-uary
1978), pp. 2—7, fsr a discussion ofvarious other types ofinterven-
tioti operatiomss.
°If the purpose of the interventio,s activity is to “lean against the
wind. --its impact may he itssuific:ierst to offset comssphetc-lv theeffect
ofehaisges in hindalssental lie terssiinamsts of the s ‘loveinesst ofthe
excharsge rate, Consequently. irsterventiors activity may isot eosss-
pietelv reverse thedi,’eetion ofexchaisgerate usoyemeuts.hut Only
slow the rate uf change.
10411 other things edna
1
, ifthe increased flow demand is sscst maim’—
tamed. dcmaoci asscl su~,pIvd:omsditiosss i’s ioreign Curi-else’ inan—
ketswill s-eturn towlsat they xvere prior to the Fc’d’s interveistion
activity. Hence, this impact would oishy be temnpurart-. See
Michael Mussa, ‘Empirical Regularities in the Behavior of Ex—
elsange Rates and Theories ofthe Foreign Exchange Market,” its
Kam-l Brunncr as md Allan H. NIel tzd—r, emIs. . Policies finr bnjilo nj—
n,ena, Prices, and Exchange Rates. Carnsegie-Rochester Confer—
elide Senidss on Public- h’cshev, supplensen t to theJonrr,aI ofMo Se—
tat’y Economics, Volume II. i 1979),pp. 9—57. especiallypp. 27-35.
many- to rise and, at the same time, motivate a penna—
neat appreciation of the dollar. It
Finally, market participants may interpret the de-
crease in the U.S. money stock as an indication of
further tightening ofmonetary policy by the Fed in the
future. Since an exchange rate is the relatix-e price of
two specific financial assets (the two domestic monies
involved), it is crucially influenced by expectations
about the course of fixture events. Conseqtsently, ex-
pectations of a tighter U.S. monetary policy in the
future shouldplace additional upward pressure on the
current DM/dollar exchange rate as market partici-
pants anticipate the lower U.S. and higher German
price levels described aboye. ~
ste-ri.hzed. I•flf ri’°nfo”and
.Itx-ehence Rate )%fnr i/ien S
The immediate impact of sterilized intervention is
the same as thatfor unsterilized intervention; that is, it
c’reates a transitory increase in the flow demand for
dollars, causing a temporary appreciation of the DM7
dollar exchange rate. The net effect of sterilized in-
teryention. howeyer, is simply a purchase of domestic
securities with foreign securities. Consequently,
neither country’s money supply will be affected; in-
stead, private portfolios will contain fewer dollar—
denominated and more DM—denomissatecl securities.
Inasmuch as sterilized intervention affects neither
the monetary flic-tors that influence the long—run be-
havior of prices nor the real f-actors that determine the
relative competitiveness of theeconomies, it isunclear
initially what lasting impact it has on the DM/dollar
exchange rate. It can h-ave a permanent impact on the
excisange rate ifthe public yiews domestic and! foreign
securittes as being imperfect sttbstitutes for each
other. ~ Because these securities are denominated iss
different currencies, it is argued, the impact of ex-
change—rate movements and the possibility of cx—
t
See. fur example, Batteis. --Foreign Exchange Markets,
‘See Jacob A. Fre,skc’l. ‘ F’Iexi1,I~:Exchange Rates, I’rices. asic) the
Role of ‘News’: Lessons from the l970s.” Jon nsa
1
of Political
Economy (August 1981). Pt’. 665-705.
tm3
See Dale NV, Ilenderson. -‘Modleling tlse lssterdepd’ndessee of
Natiomsal NImmcv alsdh Capital NIarkets. ‘‘ .1 nten’ica u Econ Otnmic Re—
r:iew iFeI,ruary 1977). pp. 190—99~Lamsd:e Girtoms and Dale Hems—
derscus. “Cc,strsd Bamsks Ope ratsoiss in Foreign and Domestic
Assets Uisder Fixed amid Flexil,lc’ Exehaisge Hates,’ ims Peter B.
Chas-k, Dennis F. Lugue, amidl Riehardl J. Sweeisey, cdls. - The
Effects of Exclsange Rate Adjmt.stnsent.s (Covt’rn,s,ent I’rimstissg
Office, 1976), pp. 151-79: I’eter Isarcl, Exchange—Rate Detee,nina—
tion: AS nrecy of Popular \‘iews and Recent Models, Princeton
S tuchic-s in Intc-rmsatim usai Filsauce Nc,, 12 ( h’,’inectoo Usuversitv
Press. 1978t,
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The Mechanics of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
Suppose that the Federal R serve putchases dollars the USmoney uppl has notbeen insulated fromthe
(in oth i’s ords s II foreign currency tnost often foreignexchange mark t transaction. If howcver cen-
Deutsch marks in foieign xchange markets in an tral banks donot vsant th irforeign a’hange mt i’s en-
att mpt to preyent (or slow) the dollar from hon to affect th ir domestme money suppl they maN
deprenattng To do iii the Fed nu t have some sterthz its impactwithan offsettnig sal or purchase of
Dent the mark which it typically a ‘pines either h, domestic assets Gontmuing th previous example if
selling some of its non negotiable DM-d nominated th Fed does not want U.S commercial bank to lose
securities to the Bnnd sbank or by borrowing DM reserves aa result of-its foreignexchange mt rvention
f om the Bnndeshank in x bange for a DM- to support th dollar it can purchase U S government
d nominat d acconn Sin~ bothofth Se tran actions secunties equal to the amount of the reserves that
are b tsxeen entral hank only - they have no impact banks lo e thereb maintaining th 1ev 1 of res i’s
on the size of eith r country s money stock accounts of the I,. S omnm rcial banks In this man-
n the n gative impact of nt rvention on the re-
Tb F d thenbuy dollar-d nominated demandde serv s of U S ommer mal banks i xactly offi v ith
~0 it offoreign comm remal bank hI d at .S com
no sub equent change in th U S mon y toek
m reial banks and pay- for th m from its DM deposits
at th Bund bank Th sp odu es i inerea in for- In a nnilar fa hioi the Bundeshank uld neutral
°‘n ommerci 1 banks r erve a count t the i themnpa tofth U interv ntionontheG rm n
Bundesbankand a d ~r as m their d mand depo it mon s upply by di’- inn ~rth newly r at d eserve
held at U S commercial b nk . Onthe oth r hand for fro the W t German co inercial banking V t m’
U -S comm remal banks both thei re en e a counts at If compl tely nh d th fore gn x hange op ra
the F d and their dem d d posit habiht sto for ign lion aff t neith r country noney supply Private
commercialbanks hay d lin d Since U S commer portfolii contain f w r dolia -d nominat d e nnti s
ciálhank re rv sIn efall whil rmanc mer and mor DM d nommn t ds untie whil th
cia! banks r sen sh v i-i n he S mon y tock Fed s portfoh ontamn more dolla den mrnated
will de -r ase and W/ t Gennai s mon supply will adfewer DM-d nominated urtti s
increase aa result oftIn for ign e eh.an m rk t
op ration
As his xan pie ofunst nbzed mt i’s ention shows ‘Thmsttutmonal a ss tmss u~set~to sm~t,rtamt h r
NI o r sithe edacqns D\4 it e pur ha ccl liar- b
lIsts tAt des mmat Se sir tm inprh pilalm et th
mAih ughth Feder JR n’s i po trasedh r di mu ao o Cr mass pphx ouhdnoth aft et din th s try ntmoss
e has earn k ti t s-v rstioss th ‘ssalssi wo Idrso ill r sgml a s itv assdth Bund barskvso Idnothas t t ribs thmupe
candy th o ‘ snte e to nh io esgn uthonue tsass
change or capita!controls add an element ofrisk to th denominate cI secnsitli s çand an ‘sec s suppl of DM—
holding of foreign assets that cannot be totally ehmi— denomin’itedl securities) xxii! exist. Consequentl in-
nate d vs it!s a dix d rsified portfolio. ~ estors will attempt to acquire idditional dollar—
denonuinated securities and sell DM—denominate d
Ifdollar denominated and DM—denommnated secur— securities in order to retum n theim portfolios to the
ities we re perfect uhststtit no change in the cx- desired propos tion of dollar-denomim ted to D\l-
ch’inge rat or in intcrest rate s vs ould be requited to denominated securitic placing upward presstsre on
n’sotiv ate in’s e’stom st ohold the ne vs portfolio that cost the D’s! value of the dollar. 15 In othe r xx ords even
tam s fey er dol!ar-de nominated and more DM though the two domestic money supplies has e heemi
denominated Se curities. If howe’s er these securities unaflected by the s stersention activity the resulting
are not peild ct substitutes insestors sxi!l be unvsilhng portfolio disc quihhrsusn(causedby Ebreign and dome’s-
to hold the ness portfolio and at the o i issal exchange tic securities hesnginpedeet sub titutes) has a persna-
sat and! intet st rates an e cc ss demand for dollar nent impact on the exchange mate.
‘Tise r alienment of pos-tIdslsos sxill mt thd s imsie t mc - pl icc s.sp x ard
14
8d e Cirton assd Ilenddrson “C mttm ml Bank
0
pm rstsssms pp 15~ fis’~ ‘, urd On C c nina’s smit rest rates ud do’ sn’s,trd ~ ssurd on
t S ntc rest rmns
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Since the efficacy of sterilized intervention hiisges
on the imperfect substitutability of foreign and domes-
tic securities, the degree ofsubstitutability thatactual-
ly’ exists is crucial. Empirical tests of the existence of
this risk have yielded mixed results. 16 Thus. whether
sterilized interyention has a significant lasting impact
on exchange rates remains uneertaims.
Intervention end ~jon.e/:afl/ Pottcq
It seems that if the monetary- authority wants to
influence persnanently the path of its exchange rate,
and not merely dampen short-run fluctuations, it must
engage in usssterilized intervention. It is clear, how’ey-
er, that unsterilized interyention is tantamount tocon-
ducting monetary policy through foreign exchange
snarketoperations. Hence, in this case, intervention is
not really an a!ternatiye to monetary policy hut merely
a variantof it. Only sterilized intervention is a distinct
policy alternative.
Since there can he only a single monetary policy
stance, the role of unsterilized intervention depeisds
critically on the importance that po!icymakers place on
the exchange rate in relation to other economic vari-
ables, as a factor influencing tlseconduct of monetary
policy. In particular. the use of unsterilized interven-
tion (with the concosnitant impact on the domestic
money suppli’) implies that the monetary authority
places relatively more isnportance on redticing the
risks arid the real economic disturbances associated
with exchange rate mayements than on influencing
domestic prices, output and employment.
Since the exchange rate is the relative priceof two
domestic monies, it is affi~cted, among other things, by
changes irs the demand for foreign money, actual and
expected policy changes of foreign mnonetary’author-
ities, and whatever changes emanate from within the
domestic economy itself. Directing donsestic mnone—
tary policy at ass exchange rate target, therefore, sub-
jects the economy to both domestic and foreign in-
fluences. Consequently, the monetary authority loses
its ahi!ity to control its own money supply indepen-
dently of foreign actiosms and! eyents. 17
The desire to inf!uence the movement ofexchange
rates without losing control ofthe snoney supply is the
primary rationale for using sterilized interyention. As
disetissed above, howeyer, itis not clear that sterilized
interyention has a significant lasting isnpact on ex-
change rates. Sterilized intervention may be an
appropriate policy to reduce tmnwanted short—run
variability of-exchange rates forwhich there snay he no
readily identifiable cause. When snone-tary authorities
desire to alter the path of exchange rate movesnents,
however, sterilized intervention tnay he inadequate.
Consequently, snonetary policymakers must choose
between imsternal and external objectives.’8
RECI•~NTEXPEBI..ENGE~
Monetary authorities seldom choose the first policy
alternative discussed abox’e; they don’t appear to like
to “do nothimsg” about the problems that they face.
Studies ofcentral banks’ demandfor and use offoreign
currencies, as well as reports from central hasiks thesn-
selves, indicate that large-scale intervention in foreigrs
currency snarkets has continued since the movement
to floating exchange rates in 1973.19Ifcentral hankers
desire to influence exchange rates, the policy choice
ssarrows down to sterilized or unsterilized interven-
tion. Although policvmakers snight prefer sterilized
intervention, since it appears to allow them toseparate
rTlse extreme ease is the omse in wlsie’ls the monetary amsthoritv
desires to nsaintai,s acompletely- fixedl exchange rate, in this ease,
the monetary amsthority has no ability atall to influence thesize of
its dosisestic money supply. Sec Herbert C, C,-msbel, lntertsation—
ai Econamie,s (Richard I). invin. Inc., 1977). pp. 375-50,
5
Faran example ofa monetary authority’s re’cogmsitiass ofthis~Iilemis-




Jelfrey A. Frankel. “A Test ofthe Existence ofthe Risk Premiesmn
in the F’ureigms Exchange Market vs. the Hypothesis of Perfect
Substitutability,’’ inter,satiomsal Fi,sarsce Discussion Paper No,
149 (Bdmard ofCoversiors ofthe Federal Reserve System, .Augmsst
i979) fimsds no support at all for the existence ofa risk premissm.
Altermsatively, Richard Meeseand Kesmnetls J, Singletosm, ‘Ration-
al Expectations. Risk Premia, asd the Market for Spot aid For-
ward Exehassge,’’ International Finance Discussiosm Paper No,
165 (Board of’ Governors of the Federal Reserve Systesss, July
1980) concludesthat thefailure ofthe forward exchassge rate tobe
an unbiased! predictor ofthe future spat rate is a consequessee (if
theexistetsce ofa risk presnium. F’inally Maurice Ohstfeld, “Can
We Sterilize? Theury and Evidence,” NBER working Paper No,
833 (January 1982)finds evidence ofimperfect asset suhstitutahil—
ity, hut questiatss theability ofcentral banks to exploit it, l’hat is,
ismsperfeetassetsubstitutability appears tobea necessary, but nsa’s’
not be a sufficient, condition for sterilized interventioss to have a
signiflcasst impact on the exchange rate.
8
tmm
See, for example. Dallas S. Batten. “Central Banks’ Demamsd ffir
Foreign Reserves Umsder Fixed assd Floatisig Exchange Rates,’’
this Rer-iew (March 1982). pp. -20-30; Jacob Fremskel, “The De-
mand for intermsational Reserves Ussder Pegged and Flexihle
Exchange Rate Regimes asmd Aspects of the Managed Float,” us
David Bigman amid Teizo Tava, cds, Time Functioning ofFloating
Exchange Rates (Ballinger, 1950), pp 161-95; H, Rube,’t Heller
amid Mohsin S. Kahsm, ‘‘The Desssand for international Reserves
Under Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates,” 1MF’ Staff Papers
(December 1975), pp. 623-49; and John Williamson, “Exchange
Rate Flexibility and Reserve Use,” Scamsdinavia,s JournalofEco-
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Table I
Quarterly Money Growth for Selected Countries
(compounded annual rates, seasonally adjusted)
Country 111/80 IV/80 I/al 1181 Ill/al IV 81 182
Canada 132°e 163/a 11% 4.7% 38/a 160% 148%
France 8.3 102 113 132 188 188 NA
Germany 45 95 16 48 1.8 05 56
Italy 118 16 18.8 45 30 10 155
Japan 61 35 28 21.0 33 110 87
Netherlands 67 102 49 53 49 57 135
Swdzerland 5,5 48 104 28 51 147 415
Unttedktngdom 20 131 158 145 51 14 10.1
SOURCE Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, InternationalEconomic Co ditions
exchange rate polic) from domestic monetarx polic~ nificant slowing during 1981.~0 The abruptness of this
they base come to realize that sterilized intervention change can b seen more clearh in table 2, which
willnot suffice, at least inssome situations. The last year reports three-month money growth rates for five of
amid a half provides a good example of the trade-off these countries. Not surprisingly, foreign short-term
inherent in the choice of intervention policy, marketinterest rates also began to rise rather drasnati-
caIN in early 1981. In thct, as shown in chart 2, market
Frosn the middle to the end of 1980, the foresgn .
-. , , snterest rates of the major trading partners of the
currency value of the dollar rose along with U.S.- . -
-. . . . . . United States generally moved with the trade-
foreign short-terms-s interest dtflerentsals. During this .-
— weighted exchange rate during the first three quarters
period (actually, snsce about N-ovember 19 iS), the
-. . . of 1981, apparently because foreign monetary author-
U.S. snonetary authority had intervened freqnientN .. . ‘ .. - sties were ttghtening their mnonetary policies in
and on a conststcntlv large scale in foreign currency .. - . - , 2,
. . ,, . attempts to instigate the rise of the U.S. dollar.
markets’, it primarily leaned against the wind, that is,
bought dollars when the dollar was depreciating and
sold dollars wlsen it was appreciating.
tmm
The relationship lmetween the trade—weighted value of the U. S.
dollar and tlse tranle—weiglstecl foreign interest sates (shown ism
chart 2) is smmueh closer imm the first ths’ee qmsai-tes-s of 1981 than ism
any interval siisce tIme hcgismsmiisg of time Limited States’ pro—
immtervcntiOim stassce. Obviously all smsonetarv policy actiosms takesi
by these eoumstriesdo midst smecessarily scReen tIme desire toachieve
exchange rate dibjd’ctivd’s. For exassspie, German has experi—
eimced a largecurs-emit aed’ouut dleficit amid Cassada susdi Switzerlasmd
have cads encdsnsmteredl accelerating nloumestic isifiatioss, TIme sssag-
nitude ofthe chasigo ism momsey gi-awth at time heginnismg of 1981
amid the fact that the tisnissg of time respoisse so cioselv paralleled
the chasmgc is L’S. policy, however, certaismlv ps-ovidle a casual
verificatioss that exclmassge rate objectives lsave played aim iismpor-
taut role,
tm0
Eveimthough Casmadla is time wily eousmtrycossidered that explicitly
targets omm the Ml defsnitioim ofssmosmey, this definitioss is esmmploved
tmecause it hasbeen foumsdi to he anappropriate indicator ofssmosme-
tan’ policy. See Dallas S. Battesm, ‘Mouey Growth Stahmility and
lnflatiosm: Ams limtersmatiosmal Cosnparisomm,’ this Recieic (Oetmmlmer
1951), pp. 7-12: and Dallas S. Batten and R. 5’’. Hafer, ‘Short-
Rmsn Money Grdswtlm Fluetuatiomms’asmd Real Eeossomic Activity:
Some Imsmphcatiosms for N-i ossetary Targetimsg,” timis fieriest’ (N-lay
1951), pp. 15-20. For Framsr’e, however, N-li growth may lie a poor
immdicator of the stasice of immonetari- pdslic~after N-Iitterand took
office in nmid-1951, Tie new arhmmimmistratiosm inmpdssed severe ism—
terest rateceilings on savings amid tiuse deposits, which sisotivated
relatively large flows froism aecoumsts not ismclude~i ism NI It o
accountsiueludledi in Ml. The smet result ivas extre-msmelv rapid N-Il
growth.
With the advent of the Reagan administration, the
Treasury announced that it (along with the Federal
Reserve) would cease daily intervemition except for
periods ofsubstantial exchammge market volatility. This
renmoved an extremely large asic! cooperative partici-
pant from foreign csmrrency nmarkets. Consequently,
foreign monetars’ authorities who desired to ressmain
active in foreign currency markets were faced with two
policy’ options if the~’ wished to have the same impact
on excimasige rates as before: either increase the
amount of their interv’entiomm (if they s-vishecl to eon—
tinue to sterilize it) or sterilize less of their existing
intervention.
The mnagnitue!e of foreign central hank interyentiomm
activity has smot chasiged significantly since the change
in U.S. intervention policy. There is evidence, howe’s’—
er, ofnmore unsterilized intervesmtioim sissee thischasmge.
Table I contains the quarterly rates of Ml growth for
several nmajor industrial coumsitries that are imnportasst
trad!ismg partners ofthe United States. Except in France
asic! Japan, Ml growth iii each country displays a sig—
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Table 2
Three-Month Money Growth for Selected Countries
(compounded annual rates, seasonally adjusted)
Date Canada Germany Italy Netherlands Switzerland
1980 October 183% ~6% 102°f 11.9% 74%
November 222 166 134 82 47
December 89 25 245 104 24
1981 January 19 70 207 99 63
February 43 38 177 65 77
March 62 7.1 117 17 168
April 111 115 57 28 16
May 82 82 37 4.8 27
June 46 60 65 82 41
July 67 29 5.2 107 29
August 70 34 22 50 57
September 106 68 09 14 68
October 287 4.1 ~8 88 171
November 19.8 08 86 98 14.0
December 227 5.1 219 1.1 996
1982 January 328 9.9 247 86 882
February 289 22 214 29 940
March 05 49 21 287 177
SOURCES. Bank of Canada Review Monthly Report of the Oeutsch Bundesbank, Board ofCoy
ernorsotthe Federal ReserveSystem: and International MonetaryFund, Internationei Financial Statis
tics Germany and Italy seasonally adjusted by this Bank
Thes policy decisions to limit the rise mu the cx that central banks were unwilling to exacerh itc the
change value of the dollar, hon c’s-er were not cost situationb~subjecting th ir economies toe’s en tighter
free, as charts 3 and 4 show. Continued economic monetar’s conditions necessary to raise domestic in-
stagnation was the price paid for redirecting monetary terest rates further and moderate the rise ofthe dollar.
policy. Except for Japan, all cotmmitries xpericnced imi fact foreign short—tem mu int rust r ntes fell eomisider-
rising unemnployment and Little or mio real economic abIs during the lastquarter of1981 amid the first quarter
growth during the first thmree quarters of 1981. of 1982. Ihus foreign ccmitrah banks siow seem willing
- to allow thu foreigsm cxchange value of their curremmcies In light of the econosnic comiditions at the tmmvsc it is .-
-. . . . to depreciate mnstuad
not toosurprising that foreigmicc ntrah bamiks responded
differently to a risimig UT.S. dollar at the end of 1981 amid
the beginning of 1982 than they did at the beginmsingof --
1981. In particular, there-emergenceofastrongdollar St SiMAK1 ~\ 1) t;O~L.11 ~IO\~
at the end of 1981 did not elicit a tighter monetary This article has attemnpted to describe, using a sim-
policy stance and the subsequent higher short-termn plc analytical framuework, both the policy alternatives
interest rates that had occurred at thc beginning ofthe as-ailable to a central bank amid their consequemices.
year. 2_ Since, in general, these countries have con- During the floating exchange rate period, central
tinned to experience eeolioniic stagnation it appears bamiksconsistently haveintervemmed imi foreigmi currency
markets. Becauseunsterilized intervention diminishes
a central hamik’s ability to comitrol its domestic mommev
22
Thmc immcrease iii time rates ofssioney growtls ahrdsadl at time begimsiming stock, it generally has opted to separate external amid,
oldie fourth qmiarter of1981 mnost likely coists’ihutcdh to time subse- internal policy’ objectives by sterilizimig the impact of
qncsmt rise iii tIme fbreigss currency valise dii the dlollar, Tlse poismt imitervention on its money stock. Sterilization, howe’s-’—
usadc. however, is timatomicc a relatively strosigdollarre-emerged, .‘
forcmksi momsdt di’ nstimom ito S dud isut spud n to it spond ~ er deem c ises the effie ic’s of muter’s emmtmomm C ommsequent
sunse ismassimer as’they had at the hegimssmissg of 1981 - ly , foreign central banks welcomed the U.S.’ pro—
10Chart 3
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intervention stance initiated in late 1978 and were
disappointed with the Reagan administration’s deci-
sion to abandon this position in February 1981.
The evidence presented in thisarticle suggests that
the February 1981 policy change has forced Ibreign
central banks that wish to influence exchange rate
movements to alter their domestic monetary growth
rates. In particular, since the exchange value of the
U.S. dollar generally has been rising duringthe past
two years, foreign central banks have had to choose
between allowing their currencies to depreciate and
changingtheirmonetary growth ratesdrastically. They
chose the latter in early 1981. Money growth slowed
dramatically, resultingin continued domesticeconom-
icstagnation in manyofthe countries examined. Since
the end of1981, they have opted fbr the formerpolicy
choice and, as a result, the fbreign exchange value of
the dollar has increased substantially while money
growth in the various countries has eased.
12